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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the Social Security Number ("SSN") by both governmental
agencies and private entities for various identification purposes is common and
widespread.' Unfortunately, a "wealth of information" 2 is accessible through a
person's Social Security number, which enables thieves to pilfer the identity of
the SSN's owner and exploit and ruin his credit, name, and life. Indeed, the
FBI declared identity theft "the fastest growing crime in the nation."3
Statistics demonstrate that the threat of identity theft is real. The Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") reports that about ten million Americans annually
are victims to identity thieves who open accounts and take out loans with the
stolen information.4 The FTC's February 2005 report "rank[s] identity theft as
the number one consumer complaint for the fifth straight year."
5
Nevada is certainly not immune from the nation's identity theft crisis. The
FIC lists Nevada as second in the nation for its per capita identity theft report
rate.6 In 2004 alone, there were nearly 3000 identity theft-related complaints
filed in the state.7 Further, Las Vegas is ranked third of all major U.S. metro-
politan areas for per capita identity theft-related complaints.8
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4 Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Crises: For Victims, Repairing ID Theft Can Be Grueling, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at C1; see also Ashley Harris, Singleton Out to Protect Data from
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Resource Center Home Page, http://www.idtheftcenter.org (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
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Law, U.S. ST. NEWS, Sept. 22, 2005 [hereinafter Sen. Bowen's Bill] ("Nationwide, identity
theft complaints jumped 14.6% between 2003 and 2004.").
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ST. NEWS, Sept. 13, 2005 [hereinafter Attorney General Sandoval].
7 Id.
8 Sen. Bowen's Bill, supra note 5 (The top ten metropolitan areas on the list include "1)
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ; 2) Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA; 3) Las Vegas-Par-
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Most people admit that they are concerned about SSN abuse.9 Most are
afraid that a thief will use their SSN to access their credit cards or other per-
sonal information.1° People's fears of identity theft "may also come about
from [the knowledge] of incidents in which [an individual's] privacy was bla-
tantly invaded."" One of the goals of this Note is to demand increased efforts
to reduce the risks of identity theft in Nevada by sharing horror stories and
presenting the insufficiencies of current legislation and judicial decisions.
Despite an overwhelming fear of identity theft, "there is an alarming lack
of legal response to privacy concerns."' 2 The pressing need for a legal remedy
is undeniable given the statistics of past events and risks of future occurrences,
especially given the excessive use of the SSN as an identifier. Indeed, the use
of SSNs for identification "is fraught with the potential for abuse [because]...
the Social Security number is the key to a government file containing a vast
amount of personal information."' 3 Courts generally permit the government to
collect, use, and disseminate SSNs as the government deems necessary, without
imposing many limits on the activity.' 4
This Note will argue that Nevadans are in dire need of state legislation
enacting a Nevada Privacy Act. Nevada residents are without a remedy to
recover from or enforce the Social Security Number provisions of Section 7 of
the Privacy Act of 1974 ("Act") when violated by state or local governments or
private actors. The Ninth Circuit held in Dittman v. California 15 - and strongly
re-affirmed its position in Durante v. Nevada 6 - that the civil enforcement/
remedy provision of the Act only applies to federal agencies. And, because it is
in a separate section, it does not apply to Section 7 - the only section of the Act
expressly including state and local government agencies as well as federal. 17 It
also held that although Section 7 of the Act met the three-prong test for a
private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the presumption that the right
was enforceable under § 1983 was rebutted by the fact that Congress purposely
included an enforcement and remedy provision to foreclose any § 1983 reme-
San Antonio, TX; 9) San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA; 10) San Diego-Carlsbad-San
Marcos, CA .... ").
9 Minor, supra note 1, at 268; see also Flavio L. Komuves, We've Got Your Number: An
Overview of Legislation and Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as
Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 532-33 (1998) (noting
that "more than eighty percent of Americans are... 'concerned' about privacy issues").
10 Minor, supra note 1, at 268.
" Komuves, supra note 9, at 533.
12 Id. "An analysis of current law reveals that while courts recognize that SSN dissemina-
tion may constitute an invasion of privacy, these same courts will rarely authorize a remedy
for such invasions." Id. at 572.
13 Alexander C. Papandreou, Comment, Krebs v. Rutgers: The Potential for Disclosure of
Highly Confidential Personal Information Renders Questionable the Use of Social Security
Numbers as Student Identification Numbers, 20 J.C. & U.L. 79, 95 (1993) ("Undoubtedly,
free and unregulated access to the highly confidential contents of this government file could
substantially threaten the statutory and constitutional guarantees and safeguards of individual
privacy.").
14 Komuves, supra note 9, at 572.
15 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1999).
16 Durante v. Nevada, 22 F.App'x 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
17 Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027, 1029.
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dies against state or local government actors.18 The Ninth Circuit admitted that
this, therefore, "leaves individuals.. . without a means of enforcing § 7(a)(1)
[of the Act] against state and local officials."t 9
Section II of this Note will outline the history and purpose of Social
Security Numbers, the recognition of the right to privacy, and the historical
development of the federal Privacy Act of 1974. Section II will also illustrate
how the federal Privacy Act and its application are in a state of disarray, with a
circuit split over whether Section 7 is codified, whether the Act applies to state
and local government agencies, whether the remedy provision in Section 3
applies to state and local government agencies, whether a § 1983 private right
of action can be enforced against state and local government agency violators
of the Act, and whether states are immune under the Eleventh Amendment of
the United States Constitution from prosecution for their violations of the Act.
In response, some states - particularly our geographic neighbors and fellow
Ninth Circuit members, Arizona and California - have recognized the shortfalls
of the federal Privacy Act and have circumvented the problem by enacting their
own state Privacy Acts.
Section III of this Note will discuss that, given the prevalence of identity
theft in Nevada and the severity of the consequences, Nevada needs to follow
in the footsteps of Arizona and California and enact its own Privacy Act. The
few protective measures against identity theft that already exist will be dis-
cussed along with the reasons why they are not sufficient. A state Privacy Act
will not stop identity theft altogether, but it would reduce its prevalence and
make it more difficult for potential thieves to gain access to personal informa-
tion. Such an Act would force those who collect information to take measures
to protect and secure it, only disseminate it when absolutely necessary, and face
penalties stiff enough to serve as an incentive to comply. Indeed, the Privacy
Acts of Arizona and California should serve as guidance for how Nevada
should address the problem legislatively.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
A. History of the Social Security Number
In response to the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
administration unveiled the Social Security Act of 1935 as a retirement plan for
Americans.2" Despite the fact that American colonists rejected the English and
European concept of an internal passport because "[i]t represented the type of
uninvited intrusion by government. . . that the Bill of Rights was intended to
curtail,"'" the Social Security Act, while not expressly sanctioning SSN crea-
tion, did permit the implementation of "'reasonable devices or methods neces-
18 Id. at 1029.
19 Id. (emphasis added).
20 Minor, supra note 1, at 261.
21 Id. at 259.
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sary or helpful' to collect taxes and to identify taxpayers."'2 2 Indeed, the IRS
commenced the use of the SSN as an identifier of taxpayers in 1962.23
The federal government has increased the dependency upon the SSN as an
identifier by expanding its use to various identification purposes. 24 There are
several exceptions permitting the collection and use of SSNs as identification
for government purposes beyond tax and employment purposes,2 5 including
law enforcement, 26 bankruptcy and tax courts,27 driver records,2" child support
records and family law, 2 9 and student loans.3 ° As the SSN has become "a
quasi-universal personal identification number,"'" there is growing apprehen-
sion about its use "for purposes other than that for which it was created."'3 2 The
express stipulation on the front of a Social Security card that "it is 'not to be
used for identification purposes"' has certainly not stopped the SSN from being
used as an identifier.33
The overuse, excessive dissemination, and use of SSNs as personal identi-
fication numbers is the root cause of identity theft. Identity theft is defined as
"the use of one person's SSN by another."' 34 Of course, only the person to
whom each unique SSN is issued is supposed to use it, 35 but the broad use of
the SSN makes it more accessible and thus more vulnerable to theft. In recog-
nition of the overuse of the SSN as a personal identifier, a Social Security
22 Id. at 261-62; see also Papandreou, supra note 13, at 79 n.2 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 422.103(b) (1992)) ("A Social Security number is issued after the Social Security Admin-
istration receives and processes a completed application (Form SS-5)."). The Papandreou
article also references the SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MAN-
UAL SYSTEM § RM 00202.001(B) (2005), to explain that "Application Form SS-5 is the
basic document used to establish the Social Security number and set up an individual's
record."
23 Minor, supra note 1, at 262-63; see also Komuves, supra note 9, at 540 n.51 ("The IRS
began to use SSNs in 1961, almost thirty years after SSNs were first assigned to Americans
for purposes of the Social Security laws.").
24 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 81.
25 Komuves, supra note 9, at 540 ("[A] SSN is the primary identifying number for individu-
als who file returns."); 26 U.S.C. § 6109(d) (2006).
26 Komuves, supra note 9, at 541 ("The largest criminal justice database in the country, the
National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") maintains lists of, among other individuals,
convicted criminals and fugitives.").
27 Id. at 543.
28 Id. at 545-46 ("The use of SSNs ... for identifying and tracking drivers is common in
several states and is specifically authorized by federal statute," 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(i)
(2000), although "[w]idespread distribution of the SSN from driver records has been phased
out with the 1994 adoption by Congress of [18 U.S.C. § 2725 (2000)] barring disclosure of
'personal information' in drivers' licenses.").
29 Id. ("The 1996 federal welfare reforms contained a number of provisions authorizing, or
sometimes requiring, the use of SSNs as a means of locating individuals who fail to pay their
child support or alimony obligations."); 42 U.S.C. § 653(h)(1) (2000).
30 Komuves, supra note 9, at 548 ("For any person to receive a federal education grant or
loan, the student must furnish a SSN to the school for which they are applying."); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1091(a)(4)(B) (2000).
31 Komuves, supra note 9, at 531-32.
32 Minor, supra note 1, at 263.
33 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 79.
34 Komuves, supra note 9, at 534.
35 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 79 n.l.
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Administration task force was created in 1970 to investigate the problem, and it
determined that the SSN was overused "to the point where the adult American
citizen is beginning to need a number to function effectively . *... "36 The
findings of the task force provoked Congress to limit governmental use of the
SSN when drafting the Privacy Act of 1974.17 Congressional committees con-
sidering the Act concluded that the extensive use of SSNs as universal identifi-
ers was "a key area of concern" and "one of the most serious manifestations of
privacy concerns in the nation."38
The use of SSNs as personal identifiers has often encompassed both stu-
dent identification cards and health insurance membership cards, thus increas-
ing the risk of the SSN being acquired by an identity thief. In response to
growing problems, many colleges have stopped using SSNs to identify stu-
dents.39 The medical and insurance industries have also undertaken protective
measures. The American Medical Association discourages the use of SSNs to
identify the insureds, patients, or physicians except where required by law. n°
Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield said it was reissuing new ID cards with "no
correlation to Social Security numbers.""n  However, despite these efforts,
"[t]he use of the SSN in the context of medical records is likely to continue." 42
Indeed, a doctor from Boston's Beth Israel Hospital has acknowledged, "there
is no such thing as a totally secure medical record. ' 4 3
B. Recognition of the Right to Privacy
The recognition of the need for "the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual ... the right 'to be let alone"' dates back over one
hundred years.44 Indeed, privacy is "central to the values and principles of the
United States."45 In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme
Court recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right implied in the Bill
36 Minor, supra note 1, at 263-64.
37 Id. at 264.
38 Komuves, supra note 9, at 532 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1183 (1974), as reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6943.
31 Cindi Brownfield, No Safety in These ID Numbers, DAYTONA NEWS-J., May 31, 2004, at
01C.,
40 See generally American Academy of Insurance Medicine, http://www.aaimedicine.org
(last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
41 Jonathan D. Silver, Woman Victim of ID Theft After Insurance Card Stolen; Arrest Made
For $14,000 in Fraudulent Medical Services, PITTSBURGH POST-GAzETrE, Apr. 25, 2004, at
Cl.
42 Komuves, supra note 9, at 539; see also Minor, supra note 1, at 254 ("Even absent
government intervention by way of reform legislation, the health care industry is in the midst
of an era of unprecedented computerization of medical records and data [because u]ntil
recent years, most doctors, hospitals, and medical centers maintained patient data only in
their local offices [while n]ow, data can be widely shared through computerized linkage of
such facilities.").
4 Minor, supra note 1, at 281.
4 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
41 Julianne M. Sullivan, Will The Privacy Act of 1974 Still Hold Up in 2004?, 39 CAL. W.
L. REv. 395, 395 (2003).
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of Rights.4 6 However, at least one federal court has found that the "mandatory
disclosure of one's social security number does not so threaten the sanctity of
individual privacy as to require constitutional protection."4 7
An individual "is entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and enjoy-
ment of that which is exclusively his" and the right to decide "whether that
which is his shall be given to the public."'4 8 However, the growth of society in
both size and complexity has led to an increase in the quantity of records main-
tained on individuals.4 9 Technology has contributed to the diminishment of
privacy rights by facilitating the storage and dissemination of personal informa-
tion electronically.5" The increase in recordkeeping increases the risk that per-
sonal information and SSNs will land in the wrong hands; therefore, "[a]s
technology improves, more privacy protections should be instituted."'"
C. The Privacy Act of 1974
Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974 on December 31, 1974; it
became effective on September 27, 1975.52 The Act protects the privacy of
personal information and records collected, maintained, and used by federal
agencies. 53 It requires "a balancing of interests between the government agen-
cies storing the records and the individuals about whom the records are kept."
5 4
Indeed, the Act deals primarily with issues of public disclosure and intru-
sion.5 5 It endorses respect for individuals' privacy by prohibiting unnecessary
and excessive dissemination of personal information between government
agencies or from an agency to entities outside the government.56 The Act fur-
ther enables individuals to determine what personal information agencies have
collected and allows them to verify its accuracy.57 In sum, the Act provides
citizens with greater "control over the gathering, dissemination, and accuracy
of information ... contained in government files . .. .,'
However, because the Act was hastily passed at the end of the session, its
legislative history is rarely of much assistance in ascertaining what the legisla-
ture intended.5 9 There were discrepancies between the bill passed by the
House and that passed by the Senate.6 ° No official committee report was ever
compiled, and there is a further lack of correlation between early congressional
46 Id. at 395 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
47 Komuves, supra note 9, at 562 (quoting Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F. Supp. 1343, 1348 (D.
Del. 1982)).
48 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 44, at 199, 205.
49 Sullivan, supra note 45, at 396.
50 See Komuves, supra note 9, at 531.
51 Id. at 573.
52 Sullivan, supra note 45, at 397.
13 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
54 Sullivan, supra note 45, at 410.
55 Id. at 395 n.1.
56 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, What Is Agency Subject to Privacy Act Provisions (5 U.S.C.A.
§ 552a), 150 A.L.R. FED. 521 (1998).
57 Sullivan, supra note 45, at 397.
58 Zitter, supra note 56, at 521.




reports and the enacted statute.6 The Senate Committee reviewing the Act did
consider the usage of the SSN "one of the most serious privacy concerns in the
United States. However, [the committee] received conflicting evidence about
the effects of § 7 of the Privacy Act .... ,62 This raises particularly problem-
atic issues in attempting to determine the section's scope with regard to appli-
cable restrictions on the use and disclosure of SSNs.
1. Restrictions on Use of Social Security Numbers - Section 7 of the
Privacy Act
Of particular importance to identity theft prevention, Section 7 of the Pri-
vacy Act is "[t]he main source of restrictions on SSN usage."6 3 Section 7 pro-
vides that "[a]ny federal, state, or local government agency which requests the
disclosure of a Social Security number must inform the individual whether the
disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what statutory or other authority such
number is solicited, and what uses will be made of it."'  Section 7 further
provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or local government
agency to deny to any individual any right, benefit, or privilege provided by
law because of such individual's refusal to disclose his social security account
number."'65 On its face, Section 7 appears to prohibit several governmental
uses of the SSN; however, given the number of exceptions to the rule granted
by Congress for SSN collection and use, "the exceptions clearly swallow the
general rule."6 6
One of the initial issues involving Section 7 is whether it is codified within
the Privacy Act, because it "appears in the annotated code as a historical note to
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a.'" 6 7 Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have therefore
61 Id.
62 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 80 n.4.
63 Komuves, supra note 9, at 549.
64 37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts § 9 (2005) (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a
note (West 2002) (Disclosure of Social Security Number)). Section 7
provides that if an entity is a local, state, or federal government agency, it cannot require an
individual to submit a SSN, unless (1) the records system for which the SSN is being solicited
antedated 1975 and then used SSNs as its identifying number; or (2) it has received specific
permission from Congress to require submission of a SSN. If neither of those two conditions is
satisfied, then the entity may still request that an individual submit his SSN voluntarily. In either
case, i.e., a requirement or request for the number, the agency must fully disclose what uses will
be made of the number.
Komuves, supra note 9, at 549-50.
65 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a note (Disclosure of Social Security Number).
66 Komuves, supra note 9, at 550; see also 37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts
§ 9 (2005) (noting that the Section 7 restrictions do not apply to SSN disclosures required by
federal statutes) (citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a note (Disclosure of Social Security Number)).
67 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 83 n.12.
[Vol. 7:640
NEVADA NEEDS PRIVACY ACT
found or noted that Section 7 is uncodified.6 s Few courts have found that Sec-
tion 7 is codified within the Act.
69
Section 7 is also the only portion of the Act expressly referring to federal
and state and local government agencies; the rest of the Act expressly applies
to federal agencies alone. 7' This express inclusion of state and local govern-
ment agencies within Section 7 raises questions as to whether it means or
implies that other provisions of the Act - specifically, enforcement provisions
found in other sections - are also meant to apply to state and local government
agencies.
The Privacy Act defines "agency" as it is defined in section 552(e) of Title
5, which corresponds to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). 7' How-
ever, the definition of an agency is found within § 552(f) of the FOIA, and not
§ 552(e) as the Privacy Act suggests.72 This error apparently "resulted when
the reference was not updated when subsections [of the FOIA] were relet-
tered; ' '73 however, it demonstrates the Act's current state of disarray.
Section 552(f) of the FOIA states that the term "agency". "includes any
executive department, military department, Government corporation, Govern-
ment controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of
the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any inde-
pendent regulatory agency .... Clearly this statutory definition does not
expressly consider or refer to a state or local government agency as an
"agency" within the Privacy Act.75 Accordingly, several courts have found
that the definition applies only to federal agencies, and not state or local gov-
ernment agencies or private actors.76 Nor does a state agency become a federal
agency because it receives federal funding or is subject to federal statutes.77
68 See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1999) (mentioning that § 7
was uncodified); Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (D.N.J. 1992) (noting that § 7
was "never codified" and it appears only "as an historical note to 5 U.S.C. § 552a"); see also
37A AM. JUR. 2D Freedom of Information Acts § 9 (2005); Papandreou, supra note 13, at 83
n.12 ("Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974 was never incorporated into the United States
Code.").
69 Schmitt v. City of Detroit, 395 F.3d 327, 330 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that § 7 of the Act
was codified, despite its being a note to 5 U.S.C. § 552a).
70 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
71 Id. § 552a(a)(1). The Freedom of Information Act is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
72 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 83 n.12; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)-(f)(1).
73 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 83 n.12.
74 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1).
71 See Zitter, supra note 56.
76 Id. at 530; see Schmitt v. City of Detroit, 395 F.3d 327, 331 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that
"notwithstanding the codification of § 7(b) - the Privacy Act applies exclusively to federal
agencies"); Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing rule
that the Privacy Act applies solely to federal agencies); Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749,
752 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that the Privacy Act applies only to federal agencies); St.
Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the definition of agency "does not encompass state agencies or bodies"); Shields v.
Shetler, 682 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (D. Colo. 1988); Ryans v. New Jersey Comm'n for the
Blind and Visually Impaired, 542 F. Supp. 841, 852 (D.N.J. 1982) (noting that "the federal
Privacy Act governs federal agencies only").
77 Krebs v. Rutgers, 797 F. Supp. 1246, 1256 (D.N.J. 1992). Although Rutgers University
was "a state-created entity, serving a state purpose, and receiving a large degree of financing
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Further, at least one court held that individual directors or employees of agen-
cies cannot be sued for violations of the Privacy Act.78
Nevertheless, at least one federal court suggested that the legislative his-
tory and statutory materials support the possibility that state agencies might be
covered within the Act's definition of "agency."' 79 However, in Schmitt v. City
of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit relied upon legislative history and held to the con-
trary: a city was not an "agency" under the Privacy Act's definition ° because
a city is not an "agenc[y] that fell under control of federal government. 8 1 That
court concluded that "the Privacy Act applies exclusively to federal
",82agencies.
While beyond the scope of this Note, another issue concerns whether
states are immune from prosecution for violations of the Privacy Act under the
Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.83 Under Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,4 Eleventh Amendment immunity to state agencies "may be
abrogated by Congressional action, provided that ... Congress made it unmis-
takably clear in the statute that they were abrogating immunity. 85 Because
Congress did not mention any abrogation of immunity within the Privacy Act,
it is likely that "an argument that a Section 7 claim against a state agency is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment will ... be successful."8 6
2. Enforceability and Remedies Under the Privacy Act
It seems of little value to enact legislation without providing a remedy for
its enforcement. Yet Section 7 of the Privacy Act - the only section both spe-
cifically addressing SSN disclosure and mentioning state and local government
agencies - does not expressly include a remedies provision.
In Polchowski v. Gorris,87 a decision upon which the Ninth Circuit relied
in Dittman v. California,88 the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Congress
provided remedies for violations within every section of the Act except for
[from the state]," it remained independent and, therefore, was deemed an independent insti-
tution and not subject to the provisions of the Privacy Act. Papandreou, supra note 13, at
86-87.
78 Parks v. U.S. Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 677, 684 (10th Cir. 1980).
79 Krebs, 797 F. Supp. at 1253; see also Zitter, supra note 56, at 521.
80 Schmitt, 395 F.3d at 330-31; No Suit Against City for Disclosure of Social Security Num-
ber, 2 No. 5 ANDREWS PRIVACY LmG. REP. 8 (January 25, 2005) ("Although Senate Report
93-1183 indicates that Congress considered applying the Privacy Act beyond federal agen-
cies, it held off doing so pending further study ... .
81 Zitter, supra note 56, at 46 (Supp. 2006).
82 Schmitt, 395 F.3d at 331.
83 See, e.g., B.J.R.L. v. Utah, 655 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D. Utah 1987) (holding that certain
state agency and state government officials cannot be prosecuted for violations of a federal
statute because of immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment); Komuves, supra note 9,
at 553-54 ("Under the Eleventh Amendment doctrine in light of Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, it may be that neither a state agency nor a responsible individual can be sued for
violations of the Privacy Act.").
84 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
85 Komuves, supra note 9, at 554 n.138.
86 Id.
87 Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1983).
88 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Section 7; however, those sections expressly apply only to federal agencies."
The Seventh Circuit furtherrecognized that the original bill did contain a rem-
edy for violations by state actors, but it "[was] deleted because of the uncertain
effect ... and because Congress felt that it lacked the necessary information for
devising a remedial scheme in this context."9 ° Hence, there is no enforcement
or remedy provision within any section of the Act that expressly applies to state
or local agencies, although Section 7's restrictions do expressly refer to state
and local government agencies.
Because there is no enforcement scheme within Section 7 of the Act, it
warrants considering whether a plaintiff could bring a private right of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a Section 7 violation.9 "Section 1983 provides a
private right of action whenever an individual has been deprived of any consti-
tutional or statutory federal right under color of state law."92 But, a § 1983
claim, although presumptively available, cannot be made for every federal stat-
utory violation.93
To bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must meet a three-prong test to
demonstrate a violation of a federal right.9 4 However, even if all prongs are
met, it merely creates a rebuttable presumption.9 5 No § 1983 claim can stand if
it is determined that "Congress has specifically foreclosed a remedy under
§ 1983" either through express foreclosure within the statute itself or by
impliedly foreclosing a § 1983 "remedy by creating a comprehensive enforce-
ment scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. ' '96
The Ninth Circuit, in Dittman v. California, held that the Privacy Act met
the three-prong test, but it concluded that Congress specifically foreclosed a
private cause of action against state and local governments under Section 7
when enacting the Privacy Act because the Act's civil remedy provision, 5
89 Zitter, supra note 56.
90 Id. at 533.
91 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declar-
atory relief was unavailable.
92 Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003).
93 15 AM. JUR. 2 D Civil Rights § 66 (2000).
94 Id. The three-prong test requires that
(1) Congress must intend that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff, (2) the right assert-
edly protected by the statute must not be so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would
strain judicial competence, and (3) the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation
on the states, in that the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory
rather than precatory terms.
Id. (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997)).
95 Id. at n.69 ("Congress has implicitly foreclosed a 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 action to enforce a
right, privilege or immunity created by a federal statute if the remedial scheme inherent in
the federal statute itself is so comprehensive as to leave no room for additional private reme-
dies under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.").
96 Id. § 66.
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U.S.C. § 552a(g), was exclusively limited to federal agencies. 97 Congress pur-
posely included an enforcement and remedy provision to foreclose any § 1983
remedies against state or local government actors.98 It admitted that this
"leaves individuals .. .without a means of enforcing § 7(a)(1) [of the Act]
against state and local officials" despite that Section 7's prohibitions applied to
them.99
The Ninth Circuit held steadfast to its holding in Dittman in its brief deci-
sion in Durante v. Nevada, where a student at the Community College of
Southern Nevada brought suit against the school and the state of Nevada chal-
lenging the use of SSNs for identification of students, particularly on student
ID cards."o The district court previously denied Natalie Durante's request for
an injunction because the Privacy Act remedies provision, found in Section 3 of
the Act, applies only to violations by federal agencies. She lost her case at trial
and, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to overrule Dittman v. California,
concluding that there is "no private right of action against any of the defendants
directly under the Privacy Act or through § 1983 . .. ."0'
Although of little help to Nevadans, the Eleventh Circuit strongly dis-
agrees with the Ninth Circuit and has found that an individual could enforce his
rights under Section 7 of the Privacy Act with a private right of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.102 In Schwier v. Cox, the court criticized the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Dittman because Dittman involved Section 7 of the Act, yet the
Ninth Circuit relied on two decisions that solely involved Section 3 of the
Act.10 3 The Eleventh Circuit noted that Section 7 of the Act was valid and still
held great statutory weight, despite the fact that it was a note to the Act. "o The
court further disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, finding that Congress did not
foreclose a § 1983 private right of action within the Privacy Act because Sec-
tion 7, which mentions state and local government agencies, is unlike Section 3
of the Act because it does not have any enforcement remedial scheme. 105
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Section 7 may be enforced by a
§ 1983 claim because Congress did not explicitly foreclose one and a § 1983
claim is not incompatible with the statute because there is no remedial scheme
in Section 7 with which there could be incompatibility." 6 Unfortunately, this
decision does nothing to aid Nevadans. Nevadans are bound by the Ninth Cir-
97 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 1999).
98 Id.
99 Id.
zoo Durante v. Nevada, 22 F.App'x 857, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
'o' Id. (noting that "because Dittman makes it clear that Durante has no private right of
action against any of the defendants directly under the Privacy Act or through § 1983, we
must deny the appeal." (citation omitted)).
102 Schwier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1292, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003).
103 Id. at 1289 (referencing Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1999) and
Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1983)). The court distinguished those Section
3 cases because they held that the Privacy Act only applied to federal agencies, which the
Eleventh Circuit noted was because Section 3 does, in fact, only expressly apply to federal
agencies. Id.
'04 Id. at 1288.
105 Id. at 1289.
106 Id. at 1292.
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cuit's decision in Dittman, which precluded a § 1983 claim for violations of
Section 7 of the Privacy Act.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Nevada's Need for a Privacy Act
1. Inadequacy of Current Law
The federal Privacy Act of 1974 is not of much use in restricting the dis-
semination and overuse of SSNs, particularly for Nevadans. The intent was for
Section 7 of the Act to prevent excessive disclosure of SSNs; however, there
are several exceptions requiring disclosure nonetheless. There is confusion
over whether Section 7 - the only section to address specifically both SSN
privacy and mention state and local government agencies - is even codified.
There is disagreement over whether the Act's definition of "agency" applies to
state and local government agencies at all, despite that they are expressly men-
tioned in Section 7. Further, it is undisputed that the Act does not apply to
private actors or agencies. Finally, while some jurisdictions permit a § 1983
private right of action in light of the lack of an enforcement or remedies provi-
sion in Section 7, Nevada is controlled by the Ninth Circuit, which precludes
such a claim. Thus, it seems that there is no way for Nevadans to enforce the
SSN restrictions of the Act whatsoever.
In light of the issues with the Privacy Act, a feasible goal should be to try
to reduce the risk of identity theft by taking a preemptive strike and making
personal information, specifically Social Security numbers, less accessible.
The goal is to try to stop identity theft before it happens and to enjoin certain
activities that increase the risk and make it easier for thefts to occur. Nevadans
are in need of such protection.
There are already criminal remedies in place when someone is caught
stealing an identity.' °7 Almost every state has enacted state criminal laws
related to prosecuting those few identity thieves who are caught.'o 8 The illegal
use of SSNs is punished with federal criminal penalties."° Fraudulent actions
to obtain a SSN or the misrepresentation or alteration of a SSN are felonies
punishable by up to five years in prison.1t 0
107 In 1998, the federal government enacted the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence
Act of 1998, which made identity theft a federal crime. See Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat.
3007 (1998).
108 See Identity Theft Resource Center, supra note 4.
109 Komuves, supra note 9, at 556 (citing 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)).
I1o Id. at 556 n.147.
Specifically, a criminal penalty may be imposed when any individual, with the purpose of...
obtaining any benefit, or obtaining anything of value, or for any purpose: (A) willfully, know-
ingly, and with intent to deceive, uses a social security account number ... (B) with intent to
deceive, falsely represents a number to be the social security account number assigned.., to him
or to another person, when in fact such number is not the social security account number
assigned ... to him or to such other person; or (C) knowingly alters a social security card ....
buys or sells a card that is, or purports to be, a card so issued, counterfeits a social security card,




However, it is rare that perpetrators are ever caught and prosecuted. "'
Studies show that identity thieves face a mere "1 in 700 chance of getting
caught." 12 When one couple victimized by identity theft hired a private inves-
tigator on their own, the investigator was able to find the thief and his address
and turned the information over to police.' However, when police went to
the district attorney with the information, he said "that it would be necessary to
obtain a confession from [the thief] or catch him in the possession of fraudu-
lently obtained merchandise or credit cards."' "' This shows just how difficult
it is to arrest someone for identity theft and why it needs to be prevented rather
than rarely punished.
While statutes criminalizing identity theft and imposing penalties on those
few that are caught may serve as a minor deterrent, there is little besides the
Privacy Act to prevent the thefts from occurring in the first place. This is why
Nevada needs to take measures to enforce strictly the prevention of excessive
and unnecessary disclosure and dissemination of personal information such as
SSNs by enacting its own Privacy Act.
There is no doubt that the prevalence of identity theft and its serious con-
sequences have been recognized. Some scholars feel that an amendment to the
Privacy Act is both in the best interests of the public and required in order to
update it, particularly because "the problem will only grow with time.""' 5
There are, indeed, a number of bills floating through various Senate and House
committees involving SSNs and identity theft introduced in response to the
problems with stolen personal information." 6 However, the legislature has yet
to pass either an amendment to the existing federal Privacy Act or the enact-
ment of a new law that protect SSNs or prevents identity theft."
17
In particular, the Social Security Protection Act has been seemingly
bounced from committee to committee since at least 2000 with a new version
renewed and re-introduced every year. For example, in a prior session of Con-
gress, the Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of
2005, H.R. 1745 was pending for passage, and, had it been enacted into law, it
would have reduced the use of consumers' Social Security numbers for identifi-
cation purposes." 8 Both the House and Senate introduced numerous bills simi-
larly addressing identity theft and the misuse and dissemination of Social
I"1 Zeller, supra note 4.
112 Id.
113 Jane Ann Morrison, Identity Thieves Thrive on Security Cracks, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Sept. 8, 2005, at lB.
114 Id.
115 Sullivan, supra note 45, at 412.
116 Robert Dodge, Congress Looks at Curbing Identity Theft, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr.
4, 2005.
".. See generally Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov. (last visited Feb. 19, 2006)
(Indeed, any bills introduced addressing identity theft or the dissemination of Social Security
numbers seem to die in committees and are never passed.).
118 Id.
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Security Numbers again in 2007, but it is not clear when any of these bills may
get out of committee, much less enacted into law.' 
9
Recent Nevada legislation suggests that the legislature has an appreciation
for the consequences of identity theft and may be open to a Nevada Privacy
Act. The Nevada legislature recently amended Chapter 205 of Nevada Revised
Statutes regarding criminal penalties for the misuse of personal information:
An ACT relating to personal identifying information; prohibiting the establishment or
possession of a financial forgery laboratory; enhancing the penalties for crimes
involving personal identifying information that are committed against older persons
and vulnerable persons; requiring the issuer of a credit card to provide a notice
including certain information concerning its policies regarding identity theft and the
rights of cardholders when issuing a credit card to a cardholder; requiring data collec-
tors to provide notification concerning any breach of security involving system data;
making various other changes concerning personal identifying information; providing
penalties; and providing other matters properly relating thereto.' 20
Nevada has also taken steps to assist victims of identity theft by adopting a
new program called "The Identity Theft PASSPORT program," which serves to
provide identity theft victims with a state-issued ID card that indicates the
holder was a victim.' 2' The PASSPORT card includes the victim's photo, cur-
rent address, and thumbprint and can be used to notify creditors and police that
the holder was a victim of identity theft.12 2 The ID card "can help prevent
evictions, bill collections and arrests while the victim cleans up their
record." 12 3 The program commenced January 1, 2006.124 However, although
useful to identity theft victims, the PASSPORT program does nothing to pre-
vent the thefts from happening in the first place.
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Dittman v. California is troubling because its
decision admittedly leaves Nevadans "without a means of enforcing § 7(a)(1)
[of the Act] against state and local officials.' 2 5 If there is no remedy under the
Privacy Act and no § 1983 right of action - therefore leaving Nevadans without
a way to enforce the state or local governments from putting them at risk of
identity theft - then a state Privacy Act must be enacted as a partial solution to
the problem. Of course because the federal Privacy Act does not apply to pri-
vate actors, the prohibitions introduced in a state Privacy Act should apply to
them as well. A Nevada Privacy Act could provide restrictions on the collec-
tion, use, and dissemination of SSNs and provide a remedy for violations -
without having to wait for Congress to finally clarify or enact new federal
legislation.
119 Id. (That many bills are introduced each year demonstrates an understanding and appre-
ciation for the problem; however, several years of bill-tracking reveals that every attempt to
address the issue die in committees.)
120 Act of June 17, 2005, 2005 Nev. Stat. 2496.
121 New ID-Theft Program to Be Unveiled on Tuesday, RENO GAZEI'rE J., Sept. 8, 2005, at
4 [hereinafter New ID-Theft Program].
122 Attorney General Sandoval, supra note 6.
123 New ID-Theft Program, supra note 121.
124 Attorney General Sandoval, supra note 6. See also Nevada Attorney General, Identity
Theft Passport Program, http://ag.state.nv.us/menu/passport/introduction.htm (last visited
Apr. 13, 2007).
125 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d at 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 1999).
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2. Serious Effects and Consequences of Identity Theft to Victims
"[I]dentity theft has become endemic" 126 and is "the fastest growing crime
in the nation."' 12 7 Over twenty-seven million people nationwide and over 5000
people in Southern Nevada alone are victims of identity theft.' 28 Nevada is
listed second in the nation by the FTC for its per capita identity theft report
rate.' 29 Las Vegas is ranked third of all major U.S. metropolitan areas for per
capita identity theft-related complaints.130 Nevadans undeniably need protec-
tion of their SSNs because of the prevalence of identity theft within the state
and because most become victims after their personal information is taken from
documents or databases holding their SSN.1
3 1
Examining the severity of the consequences of identity theft helps to
appreciate the need for legislation preventing identity theft. One identity theft
victim 1 32 returned home from a Christmas with family to find his mailbox full
of brochures for attorneys offering their services because they had seen he was
recently arrested. He learned that someone created a driver's license with the
victim's personal information but with the thief s picture. The thief used the
fraudulent license and SSN to steal the victim's identity for a weekend shop-
ping spree, opening store credit cards at Burdines, Circuit City, Office Depot,
JCPenney, and Wal-Mart and maxing-out the limits on every card for over
$10,000 worth of clothing, computers, cameras, camcorders, and car stereos.
The thief proceeded to open a Blockbuster account, rented video games and
DVDs and, of course, did not return them.
When attempting to open a Best Buy credit card, the thief was arrested for
having a fictitious credit card; however, the thief handed over the false driver's
license with the victim's information, leaving the victim to attend court hear-
ings and plead his case of identity theft. Although the credit card charges were
waived, the victim still has to explain the incident every time he applies for
credit and constantly worries of a future occurrence because his information is
still out there.
Victims of identity theft are not treated with much sympathy. When the
victim questioned Circuit City for allowing someone to max out a $6000 credit
limit in a day, the manager told him to have a good life and hung up on him.
Police failed to return his frequent calls, and little was done to investigate the
matter. The retail stores were slow in sending affidavits to make fraud claims.
JCPenney made the victim go through store surveillance with a manager to
assure them that it was not he who opened the accounts. In sum, everyone
doubted that he was actually a victim. This victim is convinced that were it not
necessary to disclose his personal information so frequently to so many who
demand it, this may have been prevented.
126 Dodge, supra note 116.
127 Nash, supra note 3.
128 Omar Sofradzija, March Break-In: Stolen DMV Materials Found, LAS VEGAS REv.-J.,
June 3, 2005, at IA; see also Dodge, supra note 116.
129 Attorney General Sandoval, supra note 6; New ID-Theft Program, supra note 121.
130 Sen. Bowen's Bill, supra note 5.
131 Brownfield, supra note 39.
132 The victim, the author's brother, provided an account of his identity theft experience for
purposes of this Note.
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Identity theft can ruin the financial lives of victims "who risk having bank
accounts drained and credit ratings ruined."' 33 Consumers who are asked to
provide personal information can become identity theft victims to thieves who
will exploit their Social Security, driver's license, and credit card numbers. 3 '
Identity thieves are often employees pilfering clients' information from their
employer's files' 3 5 or "dumpster divers" who get information from the victims'
trash or from their doctor's offices,136 insurance companies, credit card compa-
nies, or any other business with which the victim has shared personal informa-
tion.' 3 7 Thieves also frequently obtain SSNs from documents containing the
number and stolen from mailboxes.
Identity thieves frequently use the stolen SSNs to apply for credit cards in
the victim's name, 138 sometimes by creating fake driver's licenses with the
victim's information imprinted on it but including the thief s photograph.' 3 9
Thieves have even been known to file bogus electronic tax returns with stolen
information to the IRS claiming huge refunds and then get "refund anticipation
loans" from banks or tax preparation services.14 ° Methamphetamine rings are
known to use the SSNs stolen by addicts in exchange for drugs, to write bad
checks or even take out life insurance policies on addicts who they know are
likely to die, and then to collect on the policies. 4 '
However, the majority of identity theft cases entail opening credit card
accounts, subsequent purchasing luxury items, and accumulating fraudulent
debts."' Such debts have been known to include rental cars that were never
returned, delinquent mortgages, jewelry, and cellular phone accounts. 14 3 For
example, in Las Vegas, a Luxor casino employee was caught after stealing the
SSNs of two people and using them to obtain a Nevada driver's license, pass-
I33 Sofradzija, supra note 128.
134 Dodge, supra note 116.
131 Joseph Menn, Federal ID Act May Be Flawed, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2005, at CI
("Workers also leak address, Social Security and other information for cash to private detec-
tives, bill collectors and the like, a problem Nevada DMV spokesman Tom Jacobs said
probably would increase as information became available from other states' databases.").
136 Id. ("A 2004 survey of the previous year's news accounts.., found licenses-for-bribes
schemes in Nevada [and several other states] .. "); Zeller, supra note 4 (discussing how
two thieves had stolen elderly patients' personal information from the eye-care center where
they worked).
117 Komuves, supra note 9, at 534 ("In addition, public employees with access to govern-
ment computers have also been sanctioned after illegally accessing SSNs to perpetrate
fraud."); Menn, supra note 135 ("More typically, low-level state employees take money to
issue [drivers'] licenses improperly."); Morrison, supra note 113.
131 Brownfield, supra note 39.
139 Zeller, supra note 4.
140 Id.
141 ID Theft Hits Big Time, PRIVACY J., July 1, 2004, at 6; see also John Leland, Meth
Users, Attuned to Detail, Add Another Habit: ID Theft, N.Y. TIMES, July I, 2006, at AI
(noting that the majority of identity theft cases involve meth users or dealers and noting the
relationship of the states with the highest rates of identity theft, such as Nevada, Arizona,
California, Texas, and Colorado, to the levels of illegal immigration and meth use in these
states).
142 Nash, supra note 3.
143 Zeller, supra note 4.
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port, firearm permits, and numerous credit cards.""4 The thief then mortgaged
a house for almost $450,000, financed two luxury cars, and worked under other
people's SSN to avoid paying federal income tax. 14 5
Indeed, mortgage fraud is a particularly severe issue and should be
addressed in a Nevada Privacy Act. An FBI briefing ranked Nevada within the
top ten "mortgage fraud hot spots."' 4 6 The particular problem with mortgage
fraud is that "loan brokers do not have to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act"
and most of the industry does not have to follow any mandatory fraud report-
ing.147 Thus, it would be beneficial for a Nevada Privacy Act also to incorpo-
rate mandatory fraud reporting to combat mortgage fraud within the state,
especially given the increasing number of people moving to Nevada and the
growth of the residential real estate market. Given the prevalence of mortgage
fraud in Nevada, mortgage brokers should be required to take measures to iden-
tify and report any potential fraud before issuing any home loans.
Although Nevada's new PASSPORT program offers some assistance to
victims, the consequences of identity theft are so harsh and relentless that the
state needs to stop identity theft before it occurs. Victims suffer more than just
a damaging credit report.'48 Rectifying the fraudulent debts and charges
involves much money, time, headache, and stress.' 49 The delinquent credit
makes the victim's real creditors lower credit card limits and increase interest
rates, thus costing the victim financially for years after the theft.15° After dis-
covering their identity has been stolen, victims constantly worry that it will
happen again because their information is still out there in the hands of
thieves.' 5 ' In fact, the average victim spends about 330 hours and $851 in out-
of-pocket expenses to clear his name. '52 Additionally, victims are harassed by
collectors, face loan rejections and insurance coverage rejections, have their
utilities sometimes cut off, and often face criminal investigations as well.' 53
Also posing a risk to Nevada consumers and in need of regulation are
those private businesses and government agencies that collect personal infor-
mation and SSNs. There have been a number of sabotaged databases where
data was breached and stolen, including legal research provider LexisNexis
where the personal information of 32,000 people was stolen. 154 Bank of
America reported that it lost backup computer tapes that included the data on
more than one million customers. 155 ChoicePoint, one of the nation's largest
144 Ex-Luxor DJ Sentenced to Three Years, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Mar. 23, 2005, at 6B.
145 Id.
146 Paul Muolo, FBI Wants Broker Fraud Cooperation, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, May 9,
2005, at 1 (States on the list include California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michi-
gan, Missouri, South Carolina, Nevada, and Utah.).
147 Id.
148 See Komuves, supra note 9, at 534.
149 Dodge, supra note 116.
150 Zeller, supra note 4.
151 Id.; Morrison, supra note 113 (noting that identity theft can happen to the same person
more than once).
152 Sen. Bowen's Bill, supra note 5.
153 Zeller, supra note 4.
154 Dodge, supra note 116.
155 Id.
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data-collection companies, disclosed that it discovered that it has sold personal
financial data in 145,000 reports to criminals involved in an identity theft
scheme.' 56 And, more locally, in what was the largest loss of Nevadans' per-
sonal information in the Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles' ("DMV") his-
tory, 157 someone rammed a truck through a North Las Vegas DMV building
and stole a computer and drivers' license-making equipment. 158 Authorities
had feared the incident "could have led to massive identity theft" because the
personal information of more than 8000 people was on the computer, but when
police found it, they determined that the thief never accessed it.'5 9
Yet another problem with the Privacy Act is that Section 7 does not apply
to private actors.' 60 Additionally, there are so many exceptions to the prohibi-
tions provided by the Act that even those to whom the Act is applicable are
often exempted because there are so many mandatory uses of the SSN.' 6 '
In sum, a Nevada Privacy Act must address the collection of personal
information of consumers and assess harsh penalties for those businesses and
government agencies that do not adequately secure the information they collect.
The penalties must be severe enough to serve as a deterrent by encouraging
businesses to consider carefully whether the collection of consumer informa-
tion is absolutely necessary, and, if they do choose to collect it, they must
recognize that they need to take extraordinary measures to safeguard it. The
Act must further apply to absolutely anyone who collects a Nevadan's personal
information and SSN, whether a private entity or individual, or whether a state,
local, or federal government agency.
The need for regulation of those that collect the personal data of Nevadans
is apparent. After the ChoicePoint breach, a number of bills regarding data
breaches were introduced and debated.' 6 2 Almost half of the states have
enacted their own data breach notification bills, which require companies to
notify clients and consumers if the company believes there is a risk of identity
theft as a result of the breach. 16 3 However, some warn that over-notification
could degrade the effectiveness of such notice; as a result, people could end up
ignoring the notices and wind up becoming a victim of identity theft."6 Others
argue that the "current bills focus too much on notification and not enough on
preventing data breaches .... Indeed, a Nevada Privacy Act should focus
most on prevention and impose stringent safekeeping standards on those who
insist upon collecting personal information.
156 Id.
157 Sofradzija, supra note 128.
158 Richard Lake, DMV Data Never Accessed, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., June 7, 2005, at lB.
159 Id.
16 Komuves, supra note 9, at 550 ("Absent governmental compulsion to collect a SSN, a
private individual or entity is not constrained at all by the terms of the Privacy Act of
1974.").
161 Id. at 554 ("[T]he Privacy Act's restrictions on government usage of the SSN are all but
swallowed up by the exceptions.").
162 Grant Gross, Data Breach Bills Unlikely to Pass Before 2006, IDG NEWS SERVICE, Nov.
14, 2005, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,123515-page, l/article.html.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. (emphasis added).
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3. Inadequacy of Self-Protective Measures
There are some protective measures currently available that can help to
reduce the risk of identity theft; however, they are just not enough.
Most notably, Nevada recently became one of a growing number of states
that will permit its residents to freeze their credit as a means to help prevent
identity theft. 1 6 6 A security freeze prevents potential thieves from utilizing
SSNs to obtain credit fraudulently by not permitting access to the frozen credit
report.167 No accounts can be opened or loans taken while the freeze is in
place. The Nevada bill, codified within Chapter 598C of the Nevada Revised
Statutes, passed in June 2005 and became effective October 1, 2005.168
Individuals can also undertake a number of self-help measures to reduce
the risk of identity theft, or catch a theft in the act before it becomes exces-
sively destructive. The foremost way consumers can be proactive is to check
their personal financial information consistently and regularly on their credit
reports from all three of the major U.S. credit agencies: Experian, TransUnion,
and Equifax.' 69 Of particular benefit is the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act (FACT Act), under which consumers can now request and obtain a
free credit report once every twelve months from each of the three major con-
sumer credit reporting companies. 170 Indeed, it is difficult to detect identity
theft without reviewing credit reports for discrepancies.' 71 Consumers should
look for unfamiliar accounts that may have been opened by a thief and incor-
rect reporting of late payments.' 72 If consumers discover from their credit
reports that they are the victims of identity theft, they should immediately "con-
tact the fraud departments of the three credit reporting agencies .... close the
accounts that have been tampered with [or] fraudulently opened in [their] name,
. . . file a police report, . . . [and] file a report with the Federal Trade
Commission."'
73
Of course, consumers must take it upon themselves to request their free
credit reports and check their credit report for problems and possible thefts. ' 74
This is problematic because it requires Nevadans to be educated of the mea-
sures they must take to protect themselves from identity theft and they must
take the time to be proactive on a regular basis. Further, the expensive services
'66 Act of June 13, 2005, 2005 Nev. Stat. 1519.
167 Id.
168 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598C.300 - 598C.390 (2006); Act of June 13, 2005, 2005 Nev.
Stat. 1519.
169 Rep. Jo Ann H. Emerson (R-Mo.), A Credit Check of Your Own, (Feb. 26, 2005), http://
www.house.gov/list/hearing/moO8emerson/col_050226.html.
170 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1615 (2000).
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. But there are those thieves that are aware of the capabilities of the credit reporting
agencies and take measures to prevent the victim from learning about the thief's actions. In
one instance, a victim called the credit reporting agencies and asked the agencies to call the
victim if someone tried to open a credit card, so to combat this effort, the thief cancelled the
victim's phone service so he could not be reached. Morrison, supra note 113.
174 To get a free annual credit report, one should go to http://www.annualcreditreport.com
(last visited Mar. 7, 2007). The website suggests to "[f]ight identity theft by monitoring and
reviewing your credit report."
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offered by credit agencies and banks that purport to monitor the customer's
credit records and notify them of any identity theft red flags can fail to perform
as they claim and, essentially, offer the same services that a consumer can
undertake on one's own by accessing their free credit reports periodically. 17 5
Regardless, spotting a discrepancy on a credit report means the thief has
already acquired the victim's SSN and the theft has already begun. Checking a
credit report regularly may limit the damages, but it does nothing to prevent the
theft from happening in the first place. A Nevada Privacy Act must limit the
disclosure of residents' SSNs and other personal information to only those situ-
ations where the party requesting the information demonstrates that it is abso-
lutely necessary.
Another way people can proactively reduce the risk of identity theft is by
shredding their documents before putting them in garbage, thus preventing
"dumpster divers"' 7 6 from getting personal information from their trash. A
Nevada Privacy Act admittedly would not stop people from going through
another's trash. However, a Nevada Privacy Act could prohibit publishing
SSNs on statements and bills, thereby reducing the dissemination of SSNs and
reducing the chance of a SSN appearing on a document found in someone's
trash. For example, health insurance companies and medical service providers
often print SSNs on statements sent to clients, which unnecessarily opens the
patient up to the risk of a dumpster diver, or a potential mail thief who steals
the statement before it even reaches the patient. The Nevada Privacy Act
should further require private businesses that request SSNs to refrain from
using them as identifiers and instead develop alternative numbers for
identification.
Nevadans can also take protective self-help measures by limiting disclo-
sures of their SSN and demanding to be informed about how their personal
information will be used when they do choose to disclose it.' 7 7 But such mea-
sures may only be of limited assistance because Nevadans must be educated
about their ability to withhold disclosure and must be aware that they may be
denied service as a consequence.1 78 A Nevada Privacy Act could prohibit the
denial of services to Nevadans who refuse to produce a SSN by both private
agencies and any sort of governmental agency, except, of course, where
required by federal statute.
There are a few additional methods of protection from identity theft. Peo-
ple can now protect themselves by purchasing an identity theft endorsement on
their homeowners' insurance policy. 179 Insurance companies such as Allstate
now offer identity theft coverage; however, there is a limit on the coverage for
the endorsement, which is not always enough. Further, this option is not avail-
17' Eric Dash, Protectors, Too, Gather Profits from ID Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at
Al (noting that the fear of identity theft has prompted more than 12 million people to
purchase these credit-monitoring services, which equates to a billion-dollar business).
176 Morrison, supra note 113.
'7' Komuves, supra note 9, at 574.
178 Id. at 574-75.
179 Information pertaining to the identity theft endorsement insurance coverage provided by
a friend of the author: Stephanie Kellogg, Insurance Agent, of Holden Financial Service,
Inc., in Rutland, Vermont.
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able in all states. Of course, not everyone owns a home and not everyone who
does can afford the extra coverage. Credit cards typically cover unauthorized
charges by identity thieves but "the blunt reality [is] that victims must painstak-
ingly prove - often to disbelieving creditors - that debts are not their own." 8'
One telephone service provider recommended that those worried about an iden-
tity thief making changes on a phone or cellular account should establish a
password on their account that prohibits changes to the account without the
code. 8 ' While these measures may be helpful, they still require Nevadans to
be both educated of the measures and proactive in their use.
B. Legislative Guidance from the Privacy Acts of Arizona and California
Some states have recognized that there is no current identity theft prevent-
ative law protecting SSNs that is applicable to state and local government agen-
cies besides the federal Privacy Act. They have further recognized that there is
absolutely no current law that protects SSNs that are collected by private
actors. 1
82
In response, a small number of states have created their own Privacy
Acts, 183 specifically Arizona and California - fellow Ninth Circuit member
states. Indeed, the Acts of these states can serve as a guiding template for the
Nevada legislature in considering the needs of Nevadans.
California recognizes the personal and fundamental nature of the right to
privacy1 84 and acknowledges that "[in order to protect the privacy of individu-
als, it is necessary that the maintenance and dissemination of personal informa-
tion be subject to strict limits.' 85 California's Information Practices Act of
1977 addresses actions by both government agencies and private entities acting
under contract with the government.186 The statute calls for those requesting
personal information first to provide the individual with "a comprehensive dis-
closure of the purposes and usages of the information."' 87 Further, California
includes protections for SSN confidentiality by prohibiting the display of SSNs
on identification cards or in mailings. 88
Arizona also provides protection through restrictions on the use of SSNs,
including prohibitions against printing SSNs on cards, mailings, or any internet
site. ' 89 Further, the act applies to "a person or entity,"' 90 thus both private and
180 Zeller, supra note 4.
181 Morrison, supra note 113.
182 There is the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, where consumers' SSNs and nonpublic
information are protected, but this applies only to disclosure by financial institutions. 15
U.S.C. § 6801 (2000). Similarly, federal law also permits civil actions against anyone who
discloses or uses personal information from a motor vehicle record. 18 U.S.C. § 2724
(2000).
183 Komuves, supra note 9, at 559 ("Despite the absence of meaningful federal privacy
protections, the states have generally failed to step in with laws of their own.").
184 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.1(a) (West 2005).
"85 Id. § 1798.1(c).
186 Komuves, supra note 9, at 560.
187 Id.
188 CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1798.85-.86 (West 2005).
189 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1373 (2005).
190 Id.
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governmental actors. Effective January 1, 2009, Arizona will also prohibit the
use of an alternative identifier to the SSN on any identification or membership
card or mailing that uses more than five numbers "reasonably identifiable as
being part of an individual's social security number."' 1 This restriction will
also apply to any material mailed to the resident except on applications or doc-
uments intended to confirm the accuracy of the SSN, or to open, amend, or
close an account, contract, or policy.1
92
These provisions of both California and Arizona law are all beneficial and
should be adopted by Nevada. However, Arizona's penalty provision seems
inadequate to serve sufficiently as a deterrent. Violations of the prohibition
against printing SSNs on ID cards that are committed "knowingly or intention-
ally" are subject to a mere $100 civil penalty for each violation.' 93 The provi-
sion mentions nothing of negligent or unintentional violations, and it offers no
incentive for businesses and service providers to investigate the restrictions so
that they can "knowingly" abide by them. In contrast, California provides that
any complainant who brings a successful suit under the section is entitled to an
award of a minimum of $2500 in exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees
and litigation costs, on top of any damages awarded.' 94 Nevada should impose
a substantial fine, as much as or more than that of California, to serve as an
effective deterrent and give those who feel it necessary to collect SSNs a pow-
erful incentive to treat and safeguard them with care and with respect for the
privacy of the owner.
California is extending its privacy protections of its residents with new
bills, including one designed to require that "[sitate agencies ... follow strict
new standards when handling people's sensitive personal information" and
requires approval when there is a request for personal data held in a state
agency database.9' California State Senator Debra Bowen noted that the state
needs to make sure that collected personal data is not freely shared because that
increases the risk of identity theft. 196 She also observed that California has
"moved state agencies and businesses away from using Social Security num-
bers as public identifiers, from printing them on things they mail to people, and
• . . given folks the ability to freeze access to their credit reports, but we're
obviously not done yet because identity theft continues to rise ....
The new California bill provides a helpful and useful suggestion for
Nevada. The state should initiate an approval process that is required before
any resident's SSNs is disclosed to anyone else, including other state agencies.
Accordingly, reducing the constant dissemination of SSNs would serve to
reduce the risks of identity theft.
191 Id. § 44-1373.02 (A)(1) and (2).
192 Id. § 44-1373.02 (A)(2).
193 Id. § 44-1373.03 (A). Any fines collected are paid into a general fund. Id.
194 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.53 (West 2005).
195 Sen. Bowen's Bill, supra note 5.
196 Id. (Sen. Bowen further argued that it is cheaper to prevent identity theft but difficult to
do so when the state disseminates SSNs "to people who don't bother to ensure the informa-
tion is protected .... ").
'97 Id. (The new bill is argued by Sen. Bowen to "take[ ] the state's identity theft preven-
tion efforts one step further by setting strict privacy and security standards that state agencies
have to follow before they give anyone access to information in their databases.").
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A Nevada Privacy Act should also prohibit the use of SSNs as personal
identifiers and prohibit publishing SSNs on identification or membership cards
of any type. There are, of course, potential arguments against imposing
prohibitions against using SSNs as personal identification numbers. It is true
that "people have a limited amount of memory and cognition, and have a lim-
ited capability to remember multiple sequences of numbers"; multiple ID num-
bers for every business or governmental agency may prove more difficult than
having to remember one single number.19 Economically, the functions of
many businesses and government agencies are eased by the use of a numerical
identifier for matters including taxation, banking and credit, and driver's licens-
ing.199 However, the advantages of a prohibition against using SSNs for identi-
fication outweigh the disadvantages. The intrusion into a Nevadan's privacy
"is demeaning to individuality, [and] an affront to human dignity [because]
[p]revalent ideals of liberalism and democracy promote treating people as indi-
viduals, not as numbers. ' 20 0 Certainly the greater the use of SSNs as personal
identifiers, the greater the chance of an identity theft occurring.
Nevada citizens are left vulnerable to identity theft with no means to
enforce the federal Privacy Act or secure relief for its violation by state or local
government agencies or private actors. The Nevada legislature must take
action and create its own state privacy act, similar to those of Arizona and
California. Now seems a particularly good time to consider a Nevada Privacy
Act because the Nevada legislature recently took steps to allow residents to
freeze their credit reports and provide identity theft victims with an ID to help
them in their recovery. It is possible that, given this recent legislation, the
legislature may currently be open to the suggestion of a Nevada Privacy Act.
Given the adamant decision of the Ninth Circuit in Dittman v. California
not to provide citizens with a remedy for violations of the Privacy Act by state
or local government agencies, it seems the best way to preserve the privacy of
Nevadans is for the legislature to undertake the issue, rather than relying on the
interpretations and judgments of the judiciary.20 1 "An ideal legislative solution
would control SSN collection, use and dissemination" 20 2 and "limit the circum-
stances in which the SSN can be collected. '20 3 If it is absolutely necessary that
SSNs be collected, they must be protected and only be accessible by those few
employees to whom it is essential to fulfill their duties. Those businesses or
governmental agencies who do require SSNs should need to prove necessity
and must be held responsible for any breaches in privacy by their employees,
thus encouraging employers to select carefully only the most trustworthy of
employees to have access to clients' and patients' personal information. Fur-
ther, the businesses should be fined heavily regardless if a theft results from
their prohibited actions. The penalties must be harsh in order to compel private
198 Komuves, supra note 9, at 570.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 571 (quoting Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 973 (1964)).
201 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 96.
202 Komuves, supra note 9, at 575.
203 Id. at 576.
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and governmental actors to take extreme measures to safeguard personal
information.
In particular, due to the computerization of databases, there need to be
"[c]ertain minimum standards for handling and processing personal information
... to preserve the security of... data collection and to safeguard the confiden-
tiality of the information ...."'o Businesses should further be required to
shred all documents before discarding them. SSNs should not be used as iden-
tifiers for health care purposes20 5 or as employee or student ID numbers, and
they should not be published on health insurance cards, employee ID cards, or
student ID cards. The SSN should be disclosed only as required by federal
statute and no further.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nevada cannot wait for the federal government to enact a bill to protect
against and prevent identity theft and the over-dissemination and misuse of
Social Security numbers. The Nevada legislature has already taken commenda-
ble steps by enacting The Identity Theft PASSPORT program, amending Chap-
ter 205 of Nevada Revised Statutes regarding criminal penalties for the misuse
of personal information, and permitting residents to freeze their credit to pre-
vent thieves from using stolen SSNs to open new accounts in the victim's good
name.
The Nevada legislature should continue its efforts and proactively enact a
Nevada Privacy Act with provisions applicable to the state and local govern-
ments, and to private entities and individuals. The Act must force a reduction
in the overuse of SSNs as personal identifiers and strictly regulate the collec-
tion and dissemination of SSNs. It would serve as an incentive for both private
and governmental agencies to take measures to protect the personal information
it collects and to avoid collecting it unnecessarily, or else face strict penalties
for noncompliance. A Nevada Privacy Act is, unfortunately, not a solution to
the problem of identity theft, but it is a positive step in the right direction by
working to preemptively prevent the thefts from occurring at all.
204 Papandreou, supra note 13, at 95.
205 Minor, supra note 1, at 295.
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